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I. Introduction 
Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement.1 This thesis has been given 
in a variety of formulations—that true judgements are the correct ones; that it is better to judge 
truly than to judge falsely; and that the truth is what judges ought to pursue in enquiry. I will 
assume that truth somehow functions as a norm of judgement, and I will be focusing on two 
core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm—namely:  
 (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement?  
 (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant?  
I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call normative alethic pluralism2 (henceforth NAP)—
according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the 
normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of 
the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three core areas of the 
evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an 
important variability in the normative significance that disagreement has in these areas—I call 
this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic 
monism, I argue that a monistic approach to truth’s normative function is unable to vindicate 
                                                           
1 For example: Dummett 1959, Gibbard 2005, Horwich 2013, Shah and Velleman 2005, Wedgwood 2007; Wright 
1992. 
2 Since the label can be misleading in one important respect, I should clarify that with it I mean a pluralist account 
of the normative function that truth plays in relation to judgements. It is not part of the proposal to claim that this 
pluralist account requires or entails a pluralistic account of the nature of truth—although, the two views, taken 
together, gives a highly coherent and neat package.  
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the normative variability conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us 
with a very promising model to account for such a conjecture.  
 I leave the discussion of both the metaphysical issue of what grounds these normative 
relationships and the epistemic issue of what justifies our beliefs about them aside. In particular, 
I take no stand on the question of whether truth’s normative function reflects a characteristic 
intrinsic to the nature of truth or whether it is grounded in some features external to truth’s 
nature. I intend the framework developed here to be compatible with rejecting the thesis that 
truth is an intrinsically normative notion.3 
 
II. The Truth-Norm 
Advocates of the thesis that truth is a norm disagree about how the norm should be conceived, 
and many formulations of it have been given. The following list provides a sample of 
formulations that can be found in the recent debate (my emphases):  
Horwich We ought to want our beliefs to be true (and therefore not-want to have 
any false ones).4 
James  The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of 
belief.5 
Loewer True belief is valuable and, other things being equal, it is a rational 
doxastic policy to seek true beliefs.6 
Lynch  End of Inquiry: True propositions are those we should aim to believe when 
engaging in inquiry. 
                                                           
3 See Ferrari (2016b) for an account of the normativity of truth—especially of what I call the axiological dimension 
of the normativity of truth (see below, section II)—which is compatible with the minimalist conception of truth 
advocated by Horwich (in, e.g., Horwich 1998). 
4 Horwich 2013: 17. 
5 James 1975: 42. 
6 Loewer 1993: 266. 
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  Norm of Belief: True propositions are those that are correct to believe.7 
McHugh [T]he attitude of belief sets truth as the standard that a proposition must 
meet in order for it to be a fit object of that attitude.8 
Wedgwood  For any S, p: If S considers whether p, then S ought to believe that p if and 
only if p is true.9 
Williams Beliefs aim at truth.10 
 
While philosophers in the list take the truth-norm to apply to belief, I take judgements to be the 
things that truth is primarily normative over. Following Shah and Velleman, I consider a 
judgement to be a cognitive mental act of affirming a proposition. It is a mental act because “it 
involves occurrently presenting a proposition, or putting it forward in the mind. It is a cognitive 
act because it involves presenting the proposition as true.”11 In this respect judgements differ 
from beliefs, which are cognitive mental attitudes. The precise relationship between judgement 
and belief is a complex issue which won’t concern us in this paper.12 Somewhat simplistically, 
I take it that the end product of a judgement is typically a belief whose content is a proposition. 
Since the examples I will consider involve an evaluative process, I take them to be fairly typical 
cases of beliefs formed through an act of judging. Thus, I use the expression ‘norms governing 
judgement’ as a catchall expression to indicate norms governing the formation, maintenance, 
and relinquishing of beliefs formed by means of an act of judging.   
 Two things about this list and the current debate on the judgement-truth norm deserve 
some discussion. The first concerns the variability in the use of the normative vocabulary 
involved in the formulations above. Some formulations employ terms like ‘should’ or ‘ought’—
                                                           
7 Lynch 2013: 24. 
8 McHugh 2014: 177. 
9 Wedgwood 2007. 
10 Williams 1973: 136. 
11 Shah and Velleman 2005: 503. 
12 On this, see Chrisman 2016 and Sosa 2015, part III. 
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thus using deontic terms; others involve notions such as ‘valuable’ and ‘good’—thus using an 
axiological vocabulary; others still talk in terms of truth’s being the aim of beliefs—using a 
teleological vocabulary; and, finally, others formulate the truth-norm in terms of correctness or 
fittingness—taking these notions to be normatively independent of any axiological or deontic 
element. I introduce the term criterial to indicate this latter category of normative notions. 
Mixed formulations—i.e. formulations mixing different normative vocabularies—are also 
possible, as Lynch’s way of cashing out the normative role of truth both in terms of aim and in 
terms of correctness seems to suggest. 
 Abstracting from the many issues concerning the precise formulation and interpretation 
of the truth norm, we can capture the highlighted variability in the ways in which the norm is 
conceived by distinguishing the following normative dimensions:13 
TELEOLOGICAL   Judgement aims at truth. 
CRITERIAL  It is correct (fitting) to judge that p (if and) only if p is true. 
AXIOLOGICAL  It is valuable (good) to judge that p (if and) only if p is true. 
DEONTIC  One ought to judge that p (if and) only if p is true. 
These are four distinct dimensions of the normative constraint that truth can exert on judgement. 
In section IX, I show that the criterial, the axiological, and the deontic dimensions of the 
normative role of truth are normatively independent of each other. What about the teleological 
dimension? I take it to be (partly) constitutive of the act of judging. In judging, a subject 
performs an act that aims, constitutively, at the truth of the subject matter at issue. This means 
that all judgements, as I understand them here, deal with truth-apt discourse. In this respect, the 
teleological dimension is always present whenever a proper judgement is performed and for 
this reason I leave this dimension aside in the discussion that follows. 
                                                           
13 I focus on judgement rather than belief (as all the authors mentioned above do) to avoid intricate issues 
concerning the doxastic voluntarism versus non-voluntarism debate.  
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 With this in hand, I call a normative principle (NP) any principle expressing the 
normative constraint that truth exerts on judgement in terms of one or more of the three 
aforementioned dimensions—i.e. criterial, axiological, and deontic. The notion of a normative 
principle so defined allows for some flexibility. In this sense, all the various norms in the list 
above count as normative principles as I have defined the term.  
 The second thing worth mentioning is that the philosophers in the list above assume—
at least implicitly, in the context of their work—that their preferred NP applies uniformly to all 
judgements regardless of their subject matter. In other words, they all seem to share a 
commitment to a monistic conception of the normative function of truth—what I call Normative 
Alethic Monism (NAM). Such a conception encompasses the following two theses:  
Singularity:  There is only one NP expressing truth’s normative function on judgement.14 
Uniformity:  NP applies uniformly to all judgements in all areas of truth-apt discourse. 
I take singularity and uniformity to provide a characterisation of NAM in terms of jointly 
sufficient and individually necessary conditions. Moreover, singularity and uniformity are 
independent theses: one might deny uniformity but endorse singularity by maintaining that with 
respect to a specific set of judgements the truth-norm is normatively silent;15 or one might deny 
singularity but endorse uniformity by maintaining that truth uniformly exerts a plurality of 
normative functions for all judgements. However, neither of these ways of rejecting NAM 
amounts to what I take to be a genuine form of normative pluralism (more on this later).  
 To make NAM more perspicuous, let us consider two specific applications of it. First, 
say that an alethic deontologist is a philosopher who thinks that the unique normative alethic 
principle governing all judgements is deontic—i.e. it provides thinkers with some prescriptions 
about what to judge.  An alethic deontologist, then, takes truth and falsity to always line up, 
                                                           
14 Singularity resembles Williamson’s simple account, but without the constitutivist element. See Williamson 
2000: 240. 
15 See Williams 2012 for an account of normative silence. 
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respectively, with the obligatoriness and the impermissibility of the judgement in question. 
Second, those—alethic axiologists—who think of truth’s normative function in purely 
axiological terms—i.e. in terms of what it is good or bad to believe—will take truth and falsity 
to always line up, respectively, with the good and the bad in the way of judgements. 
 NAM imposes a structural rigidity in the normative function of truth which, I argue, 
makes it unable to account for differences in the normative significance of disagreement. 
 
III. Disagreement and its Normative Significance 
By the expression ‘normative significance of disagreement’ I mean the extent to which 
engaging in a disagreement licenses participants to negatively evaluate each other’s view. The 
kind of disagreement that matters for the purposes of this paper is something analogous to what 
MacFarlane calls the simple view of disagreement (i.e. doxastic noncotenability):16 
DIS To disagree with someone’s judgement that p is to issue judgements whose contents are 
 jointly incompatible with p.17 
Disagreement, in the DIS model, is thus minimally normatively significant in the following 
way: a commitment to judging that p is a commitment not only to the truth of p but also to the 
falsity of every content q which is incompatible with p, and consequently a commitment to 
assessing anybody endorsing q as judging falsely. However, what other kinds of negative 
normative assessment or reactive attitude18 to a contrary view are associated with an attribution 
of falsity and thus licensed by the presence of a disagreement varies in relation to the subject 
matter at issue. Call this the variability conjecture. 
                                                           
16 MacFarlane 2014: Chapter 6. 
17 Where ‘incompatibility’ here is understood in semantic terms, either as contrariness or contradictoriness of the 
propositional contents involved.  
18 In the sense discussed by Strawson 1962.  
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 With this in hand, let’s now turn to a discussion of some examples. The examples I will 
consider involve evaluative judgements—i.e. judgements about evaluative matters such as 
basic taste, refined aesthetics and, more controversially, fundamental morality.19 These are 
judgements for which a substantive kind of objectivity may be hard to sustain and, for this 
reason, they are taken to lack robustly representational content—in the sense of Wright (1992, 
Ch.4). In this respect, these judgements are not subject to the possibility of a more fundamental 
kind of failure—a failure deriving from a misrepresentation of how things are objectively, i.e. 
in mind-independent reality.  
 Moreover, I should point out that these are just a few examples that I have chosen 
because I think they are particularly fit to show the kind of variability in the normative 
significance of disagreement I am interested in. Nothing hinges on which particular example 
we choose to highlight this variability. Also, I am not claiming that all examples of moral, 
aesthetic and taste disagreement should be understood in the way suggested. Perhaps there is 
also substantive intra-domain variability. This, though, wouldn’t weaken my proposal—the 
more variability the better. However, in order to keep the discussion reasonably simple and 
smooth, I shall talk as if the three examples I discuss are paradigmatic of the three domains in 
question.  
 
IV. Disagreement (1)—Fundamental Moral 
Consider the following disagreement about some fundamental moral value between Julie and 
Jill: 
 Julie thinks that torturing people is always a morally deplorable practice. 
 Jill disagrees, thinking that sometimes torturing people is after all morally acceptable. 
                                                           
19 NAP can be integrated into a realist conception of morality and aesthetics and help in getting a handle on the 
difference in normative significance between these kinds of disagreement and disagreement about some other 
factual matters. 
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I take this to be an example of some deep incompatibility between moral values concerning 
fundamental human rights. Thus, we may ask: what kind of normative assessment of Jill’s 
contrary view would we typically expect from Julie in such a situation of disagreement? We 
would expect Julie to issue a strongly negative assessment of Jill’s view. Not only would Julie 
think that Jill is completely wrong, but she would also feel compelled to think that Jill ought to 
change her mind about that issue. In fact, she would find it quite deplorable that Jill holds such 
a morally bad view. 
 What this suggests is that the kind of reaction we would expect from Julie amounts to a 
substantial criticism of Jill’s contrary view, which, in some cases, leads to a disposition to urge 
Jill to revise her view on torture. Even assuming that Julie and Jill consider each other equally 
knowledgeable on most of the relevant non-moral facts concerning torture, once the 
disagreement comes to light they will typically cease to consider each other as equally 
respectable moral judges, at least with respect to a range of topics closely connected to the 
subject matter of their disagreement.  
 An appealing explanation of the appropriateness of this kind of substantive criticism of 
our opponent’s moral standing might be linked to a distinctive feature of moral value—namely, 
what we might call the higher-order heritability of moral value.20 The thought is that the moral 
condemnation of a certain action or practice in these fundamental cases engenders a 
commitment to judging the holding of any view favourable to that action or practice as 
alethically impermissible. In this respect, strong moral criticism of a certain practice carries 
with it a strong alethic criticism of the holding of any judgement supporting that practice. The 
criticism is typically conveyed by means of an attribution of falsity to such a judgement, which, 
in this case, goes hand in hand with assessing the judgement as impermissible.  
                                                           
20 This label has been suggested to me by Crispin Wright (personal conversation). 
9 
 That said, it is important to keep in mind that this is a reconstruction of what we might 
typically expect in a situation of disagreement about fundamental moral issues. In other words, 
this is merely a conjecture concerning the typicality of a certain pattern of response to a situation 
of disagreement in some radical cases of incompatibility of fundamental moral values. There 
certainly may be a variety of contextually salient factors that would impact on the kind of 
critical assessment that we would deem appropriate—but for the sake of simplicity I will leave 
these atypical cases aside.  
 
V. Disagreement (2)—Basic Taste 
Consider now a situation in which Julie and Jill have a dispute about basic taste. I here draw an 
intuitive distinction between judgements about matters of basic taste and judgements about 
matters of refined aesthetics. Without endorsing any controversial thesis about where to draw 
the boundary between basic taste and refined aesthetics—there might be no sharp boundary—
I will discuss two examples that might be taken as paradigmatic of each category. Let’s begin 
with the basic taste case: 
 Julie thinks that oysters are delicious.  
 Jill disagrees, thinking that they are tasteless.21 
In sharp contrast to the fundamental moral case, the kind of negative assessment of Jill’s 
contrary view we would typically expect from Julie would be paradigmatically weak—in fact 
nothing more than the realization that they have divergent views on the taste of some particular 
oysters, and this alongside with an appreciation, in typical circumstances,22 of the legitimacy 
                                                           
21 I assume, contra contextualists and expressivists, that even in the case of basic taste we can make sense of 
disagreement in terms of doxastic noncotenability. Defending this claim would take me too far away—but see 
MacFarlane 2014 and Ferrari & Wright 2017 for some arguments against a contextualist and expressivist treatment 
of basic taste judgements. 
22 Here by typical circumstances I mean circumstances in which no appreciable defeater—e.g. one of the party 
being under anaesthetics or her gustatory sensibility being temporarily impaired because of the effect of a strong 
cough syrup that alters her taste—is in place.   
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of Jill’s contrary view. If this approximates what people would typically expect in a situation 
of disagreement about basic taste, it shows that no substantive criticism of a contrary view 
should be expected. Absent pragmatic issues of coordination,23 a live and let live attitude is 
deemed appropriate. We may take as evidence of this that a rather natural follow-up that we 
might expect from Julie in coming to know about Jill’s contrary view would be a first-person 
qualification of the judgement—e.g. “Oh, well, I just wanted to say that I like these oysters”—
24 as a way of avoiding, in the dialectical context of the disagreement, the emergence of what 
might be considered an unjustified and futile quarrel. In fact, the mere presence of disagreement 
does not typically make either Jill or Julie less confident about her own opinion concerning 
oysters. What might happen sometimes is that, whenever it is plausible to assume a certain 
commonality of taste within the context of the disagreement, we experience a sense of surprise 
or curiosity in coming to know that someone we thought had a similar taste in fact has a 
radically different opinion about the food in question. 
 
VI. Disagreement (3)—Refined Aesthetics 
Last, consider the following dialogue about a matter of refined aesthetics: 
 Julie thinks that Gould’s 1955 execution of Goldberg Variations is unequalled.  
 Jill disagrees, thinking that the 1955 execution is too virtuosic. The 1981 version is 
 preferable as a more mature interpretation. 
What kind of negative assessment of someone’s holding a contrary view should we expect in a 
disagreement about matters of refined aesthetics? Here it seems plausible to conjecture that the 
kind of critical reaction to Jill’s contrary view that people would deem appropriate for Julie to 
have is one that falls somewhere in the middle of the two extremes of the fundamental moral 
                                                           
23 E.g. a situation in which Julie and Jill have to decide whether to take their best friend to a French bistro. 
24 A discussion of this point can be found in Ferrari & Wright 2017. Wyatt 2018, pp. 263-5 makes a similar 
prediction about first-person qualifications in cases of disagreement about basic taste. 
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case and the basic taste case. Thus, we may typically expect Julie to be somehow surprised by 
Jill’s contrary judgement regarding Gould’s 1955 execution of Goldberg Variations. This is 
because she would think that Jill’s judgement is somehow off-colour. Thus, a certain degree of 
criticism would be regarded as appropriate. In particular, it would be natural for Julie to 
consider Jill’s aesthetic sensibility on this occasion to be not as good as her own. In this respect, 
contrary to the basic taste case, disagreement about refined aesthetics seems to give rise to an 
attribution of fault. Although it seems appropriate for Julie to continue to regard Jill as well-
informed as she is about Glenn Gould’s musical production, by being committed to her own 
judgement about Gould and thus to her own scale of aesthetic value, she is committed to 
assessing Jill’s opinion as inferior—indeed, one that it would be better not to have. As a result, 
it might happen that in some cases the conversation continues by each subject trying to persuade 
the opposite party to change her mind. However, in contrast with the fundamental moral case 
described above, the degree of intensity of the reactive attitude that would be appropriate for 
Julie to have in response to Jill’s contrary view is significantly lower than in the fundamental 
moral case. We could certainly understand, if not justify, a high degree of heat in disputes about 
fundamental moral issues, but not in disputes about refined aesthetics. Regardless of how much 
aesthetically off-colour I consider your contrary view, granted that we are equally 
knowledgeable about the subject matter in question I would still feel some pressure to regard 
you as permitted to hold to the view you endorse.25  
 
VII. Normative Alethic Monism and the Normative Scope Problem 
I will now argue that NAM falls prey to a serious objection that originates in a particular 
application of what is known in the truth pluralism debate as the scope problem for monistic 
(substantivist) conceptions of truth. The thought at the core of the objection is that no single 
                                                           
25 See Ferrari 2016a for a more detailed discussion of the comparison between disagreement in basic taste and 
disagreement in refined aesthetics.  
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substantive notion of truth—e.g. correspondence, superassertibility, or coherence—seems to be 
fully adequate to play the truth role across all different domains.26 For instance, whereas 
correspondence might be the adequate notion of truth for our judgements about the physical 
constitution of the world, it might score less well as the notion of truth for the domain of basic 
taste and other evaluative domains. Similarly, a version of the coherentist conception of truth 
might be the adequate notion of truth in mathematics or in the moral domain, but it seems utterly 
inadequate for contingent judgements.27 Lastly, superassertibility might provide the right model 
for truth in some evaluative domains or in mathematics,28 but it is inadequate for judgements 
concerning matters that are epistemically inaccessible to us—e.g. claims about the past for 
which no evidence has survived. Thus, although all these various notions of truth might provide 
a locally adequate model of truth, none of them gives us an adequate model of truth across all 
different domains. 
 My contention is that the monistic conception of the normative role of truth faces an 
analogous problem. If something along the lines of the variability conjecture described in 
sections III–VI is accurate, then it is easy to see why NAM is in trouble. It would in fact require 
thinkers to adopt a Procrustean attitude towards the negative assessment of a contrary view in 
the presence of a disagreement, regardless of the specific subject matter at issue. This would 
mean that, depending on which NP we take to characterise truth’s normative function, some of 
the normative assessments described in the examples would be deemed inappropriate.  
 To illustrate: recall that alethic deontologism is the view according to which truth exerts 
only a deontic constraint over all judgements, cashed out in terms of ‘ought’, ‘permissible’, and 
‘impermissible’. Then this view would have problems accounting for the kind of normative 
assessment that seems appropriate in the domain of basic taste—and, arguably, in the domain 
                                                           
26 See Lynch 2009: 34–36. 
27 A classical objection to coherentist accounts of truth can be found in Wright 1998. 
28 If, for example, you endorse a constructivist account of mathematics.  
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of refined aesthetic matters as well. This is because such a view would say that false judgements 
are always impermissible and thus that a reactive attitude of rational condemnation to a contrary 
judgement would be always legitimate.29 But this is not what we would typically expect in 
situations of disagreement about basic taste or, more controversially, refined aesthetics.  
 Secondly, recall that alethic axiologism is the view according to which truth exerts only 
an axiological constraint over all judgements, cashed out in terms of ‘valuable’, ‘good’, and 
‘bad’. This view would have problems in accounting for the normative assessment typical of 
disagreement about basic taste—and, arguably, about fundamental moral matters. This is 
because such a view would say that false judgements are always bad, but not impermissible. 
However, this prediction seems inadequate for the basic taste case—because no substantive 
criticism is forthcoming—and also for the fundamental moral case—because a more 
substantive negative reaction would be expected.  
 Last, let us call alethic criterialism the view according to which truth exerts only a 
criterial constraint on judgement, cashed out in terms of ‘correctness’, ‘fittingness’, and 
‘incorrectness’. Since the kind of normative assessment of a contrary view predicted by this 
view would be paradigmatically weak, it would be inadequate to account for the kind of 
normative assessment that occurs in disagreements about fundamental moral issues and refined 
aesthetic matters—where some (more or less) substantive criticism to a contrary view would 
typically be deemed appropriate. The core of the normative scope problem is thus that none of 
these monistic views is adequate as a general view about truth’s normative function. This puts 
considerable pressure on NAM.  
 
VIII. Normative Alethic Pluralism 
                                                           
29 It is important to highlight that the legitimacy of having a certain reactive attitude does not entail the legitimacy 
of expressing that attitude. There might be reasons (e.g. prudential, moral, or other kinds of contextual factors), 
that are independent of the norms governing judgements, that would make the expression of my reactive attitude 
inappropriate even though it would be legitimate for me to have such an attitude.  
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In this and the following sections I introduce a pluralist framework for modelling the normative 
function(s) that truth exerts over judgements—Normative Alethic Pluralism⎯and show how 
this framework can be put to use to solve the scope problem. At the core of NAP are the 
following two theses: 
Plurality There is more than one NP expressing truth’s normative function on judgement. 
Variability Truth exerts a variable normative function on judgements from different areas 
of truth-apt discourse.  
Plurality and Variability are meant to provide individually necessary and jointy sufficient 
conditions for NAP. They amount to the negation of Singularity and Uniformity respectively. 
Thus, according to NAP there is more than one correct NP expressing truth’s normative 
function and, moreover, different areas of discourse are governed by different NPs.  
 NAP predicts that while the normative function of truth in one area of discourse might 
be expressed by a NP that encompasses the deontic dimension, in some other areas it might be 
expressed by a NP which encompasses the axiological dimension, and in other areas still it 
might be expressed by a NP which is exhausted by the criterial dimension—thus, without any 
deontic or axiological constraint. Interestingly, NAP leaves open the possibility of an area of 
discourse where truth is normatively inert, as it were, while still functioning as the aim of 
judgements in that area—and thus still exerting its teleological function. This means that it 
allows for a purely deflationary notion of truth (and falsity) that operates, locally, in some 
domains of discourse.30 
 In order to defend the cogency of NAP it is important to show that the criterial, the 
axiological, and the deontic dimensions enjoy a certain degree of normative independence from 
                                                           
30 The cogency of this option depends on whether we can make sense of a purely non-normative notion of truth. 
This is a debated issue among philosophers working on truth: see, for instance, Dummett 1959, Wright 1992, 
Lynch 2009, Wrenn 2015. For some replies, see, e.g., Horwich 1998, Ferrari 2016b, Ferrari & Moruzzi 
(forthcoming). 
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each other. There are two ways in which these three dimensions can be normatively 
independent: 
 (IND 1) Criterial⇏Axiological; Criterial⇏Deontic; Axiological⇏Deontic31 
 (IND 2) Deontic⇏Axiological; Deontic⇏Criterial; Axiological⇏Criterial 
Arguing for both (IND 1) and (IND 2) would get us full normative independence, which means 
the strongest available form of NAP—call it strong NAP. Otherwise we could argue for only 
one direction of normative independence, and we would get two possible moderate forms of 
NAP—the first endorses (IND 1) without endorsing (IND 2), while the second endorses (IND 
2) without endorsing (IND 1).32 Since the relevant direction of normative independence that we 
need in order to deal with the variability illustrated in the examples above is that expressed by 
(IND 1), in what follows I will argue for (IND 1) only, and I will remain silent on (IND 2). 
Moreover, to provide a full defence of the relevant moderate version of NAP we need an 
argument to show that (IND 2) fails—i.e. to show that we have at least one of the following 
direction of normative dependence:  
 (DEP 1) deonticaxiological 
 (DEP 2) deonticcriterial 
 (DEP 3) axiologicalcriterial 
Even though I believe that these normative dependences are plausible, I won’t argue for them. 
What I will do in the next section is to defend a minimal version of NAP that is sufficient to 
solve the impasse generated by the normative version of Lynch’s scope problem. Such a 
                                                           
31 ‘⇏’should be read as: ‘does not enforce…’. 
32 It is helpful to point out that the views that I call 'strong NAP' and 'moderate NAP' are quite different from the 
views that are often called 'strong alethic pluralism' and 'moderate alethic pluralism' in the alethic pluralism debate. 
Two remarks are especially relevant on this: first, that strong NAP doesn't entail strong alethic pluralism and, 
second, that moderate NAP doesn't entail moderate alethic pluralism. 
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minimal version can then be elaborated either in the direction of strong NAP or in that of 
moderate NAP. 
 
IX. Minimal Normative Alethic Pluralism 
To argue for minimal NAP we need to establish the following two claims: (i) that the presence 
of the criterial dimension by itself does not enforce either the axiological dimension or the 
deontic dimension and (ii) that the axiological dimension by itself does not enforce the deontic 
one. 
 Let’s discuss the first claim first. The criterial dimension provides us with a standard 
for categorising judgements as correct or incorrect in accordance with the truth-value of their 
propositional content. There is an on-going debate about how to interpret the correctness norm 
and in what sense it is normative33—whether in deontic terms, such as ‘ought’, or in what I call 
axiological terms, such as ‘good’, ‘bad’, and ‘valuable’. I reject both interpretations. More 
precisely, I do not think that we are forced to adopt either interpretation. I follow McHugh34 
here in understanding correctness as a distinct normative property in its own right, as neither 
deontic nor axiological. This thesis presupposes that the category of the normative should be 
conceived—as Thomson (2008) suggests—as more variegated than philosophers have 
traditionally sustained. Taking this on board, it may be argued that for a judgement to be correct 
is for it to have a normative property. But it is not correct because one ought to hold it, or 
because it would be good if one held it. Correctness is distinct from these other normative 
properties. For one thing, quite intuitively, while tipping might be the correct thing to do in a 
certain restaurant, provided that you have received adequate service, it’s not something 
obligatory—thus refraining from tipping would be somehow incorrect, given the 
circumstances, but not impermissible. In this respect, the fact that it is correct to judge that p 
                                                           
33 See Thomson 2008 for a discussion of the various kinds of normativity in relation to judgements. 
34 See McHugh 2014 and McHugh and Way 2015. 
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does not imply that the subject ought to judge that p. Moreover, something might be a correct 
thing to do, because, e.g., it is within your rights to do so, without this implying that it is also a 
valuable or good thing. The correct way of setting the table is to put the knife to the right of the 
plate and the fork on the opposite side, but intuitively there’s nothing valuable in setting the 
table that way.35 In this respect, the criterial dimension does not entail the axiological one. In 
general, there should not be any deep difficulty in the thought that something could be correct 
without being valuable or obligatory, or incorrect without being disvaluable or impermissible. 
However, further inquiry is needed into what specific kind of sui generis normative notion 
correctness may be.36   
 Let us now turn to a discussion of the second normative independence claim—i.e. that 
the presence of the axiological dimension by itself does not enforce the presence of the deontic 
one. The axiological dimension tells us that it is, at least pro tanto, good, or valuable, to judge 
according to what is true, and that it is, at least pro tanto, bad, or disvaluable, to judge falsely. 
Again, how to understand the axiological dimension is a much-discussed topic.37 However, for 
the purpose of this paper we can leave the many, undoubtedly important, issues raised by that 
debate aside, and focus on the question of whether the axiological dimension per se entails the 
deontic dimension. There are reasons for thinking that it does not. As McHugh points out: 
Something may be bad without its badness being a matter of anyone’s having 
done anything they ought not have done, and without its being the case that 
there is anyone who ought to change it; some prospective state of affairs or 
                                                           
35 There is a similar, and familiar, contrast in the normative ethics debate: one might think that right actions are 
those that maximise utility but ask what is good about doing what is right.  
36 McHugh (2014: 177) suggests that we should understand correctness in terms of fittingness: ‘the attitude of 
belief sets truth as the standard that a proposition must meet in order for it to be a fit object of that attitude […] 
For an attitude to be fitting is for it to have a normative property. But it is not fitting because you ought to hold it, 
or because you may hold it, or because it would be good if you held it. Fittingness, I maintain, is distinct from 
these other normative properties’. 
37 See, for instance, David 2005, Hazlett 2013, Kvanvig 2003, Lynch 2005, McHugh 2012. 
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object may be good without its being the case that there is anyone who ought 
to produce it or bring it about.38  
Thus, a false judgement may be bad or disvaluable without its badness or disvalue being a 
matter of someone having done anything they ought not to have done in judging so. 
Analogously, a true judgement may be good or valuable without its being the case that anyone 
ought to judge that way.  
 This thought can be substantiated by drawing a parallel between the moral case and the 
alethic case by means of the notions of supererogation and suberogation. In ethics, a 
supererogatory act is generally conceived as an act that goes beyond the call of duty and brings 
about a considerable moral good. As Chisholm puts it, supererogatory acts are “non-obligatory 
well-doing”.39 By contrast, following Chisholm’s characterisation, we can say that 
suberogatory acts are “non-forbidden ill-doing”, or, in Driver’s words ‘suberogatory acts are 
bad to do, but not forbidden’.40 Heroic acts are typical examples of the supererogatory: if I 
sacrifice my life in order to save a group of children who would otherwise die, this would be 
considered extremely good and valuable, but clearly non-obligatory—even if sacrificing my 
life is the only way to save those children. As an example of a suberogatory act, consider the 
following scenario. Julie has two perfectly healthy kidneys, but she refuses to donate one kidney 
to her sister Jill, who desperately needs one. Julie’s refusal would be clearly suberogatory. Since 
Julie is under no obligation to donate her kidney, her refusal is not an impermissible thing to 
do. However, we would certainly consider such a refusal morally disvaluable. This reflects the 
widespread thought that it would be better if Julia donated her kidney to Jill.  
 What the categories of the supererogatory and suberogatory show is that there are acts 
that are intuitively morally optional but still open to an axiological assessment as to whether 
                                                           
38 McHugh 2012: 10. 
39 Chisholm 1963: 3. 
40 Driver 1992: 286. 
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they are good or bad. In the alethic case, we may say that an alethically supererogatory 
judgement—understood, remember, as a cognitive mental act—is a good judgement to make, 
because true, but not obligatory, while an alethically suberogatory judgement would be a 
judgement that is bad in that it violates the axiological dimension of the normative function of 
truth without thereby being a judgement that ought not to be performed.41 
 Unless we can find an argument to show that the concept of alethic suberogation is 
incoherent we should remain open to the possibility that in some areas of discourse there are 
cases of suberogatory judgements. This means that we should be wary of assuming that 
compliance with or violation of the axiological dimension automatically engenders compliance 
with or violation of the deontic dimension. As a consequence, we have the idea that truth’s 
normative function in some domain may encompass the axiological dimension while at the 
same time being deontically silent. 
 No doubt, more need to be said to have an exhaustive picture of how these dimensions 
of truth’s normative role are related to each other. However, I take the remarks that I have just 
offered as sufficient to establish the reasonableness of the partial normative independence claim 
(IND 1). This granted, we have at least the following four NPs governing truth’s normative 
function:  
(NP-1)  Truth exerts a deontic constraint on judgements—perhaps together with both an 
axiological and a criterial constraint if we endorse (DEP 1 and DEP 2). 
(NP-2) Truth exerts an axiological but not a deontic constraint on judgements—perhaps 
together with a criterial constraint if we endorse (DEP 3). 
(NP-3)  Truth exerts only a criterial constraint on judgements. 
(NP-4)  Truth exerts no normative constraint—besides its teleological role.  
                                                           
41 Turri first applied the category of the suberogatory to the case of the normativity of assertions, but differently, 
and with different aims; see Turri 2013.  
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X. Normative Alethic Pluralism and the Normative Scope Problem 
How does NAP help in dealing with the normative version of Lynch’s scope problem as 
illustrated in section VII? The specific kind of negative normative assessment that I have in 
mind here can be understood by means of the notion of normative fault. The conjecture 
concerning the variable normative significance of disagreement discussed above can be 
reformulated as follows: the kind of fault that is attributable to someone holding a contrary view 
in the context of a disagreement might vary in relation to the subject matter of the disagreement. 
What does this variation in normative fault amount to? How should we model it? Once we take 
normative alethic pluralism on board, we are open to the idea that there is more than one 
dimension in which truth governs judgement. Correspondingly, we have a plurality of ways in 
which someone holding a view that is judged false might be said to be at fault. Thus, we have 
the following four categories of fault-attribution: 
DEONTIC FAULT In judging not-p the subject is judging in a way she ought not to. 
AXIOLOGICAL FAULT In judging not-p the subject is doing something disvaluable.  
CRITERIAL FAULT In judging not-p the subject is judging incorrectly. 
NO FAULT  It is perfectly fine for the subject to judge the way she does.  
As we saw in the previous section, the various dimensions of truth’s normative profile are to a 
certain extent independent of each other. The various kinds of attributions of normative fault I 
have just introduced enjoy an analogous kind of independence. In particular, in line with the 
minimal version of NAP I am endorsing here, the three main categories of fault attribution listed 
above are independent of each other in the following way: 
(IND 3) CRITERIAL FAULT⇏AXIOLOGICAL FAULT; CRITERIAL FAULT⇏DEONTIC FAULT;
  AXIOLOGICAL FAULT⇏DEONTIC FAULT. 
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Whether the other direction of independence also stands depends on whether we argue for a 
moderate or a strong version of NAP. I intend to remain neutral on this issue. 
 Thus, we might say that one's recognition that one disagrees with another person about 
certain subject matters licenses an attribution of criterial fault without licensing an attribution 
of axiological or deontic fault. Reflecting on the kind of negative assessment that seems 
appropriate in the disagreement between Julie and Jill about oysters, this could be the right 
prediction. Thus the (NP-3) model of the normativity of truth seems to be the adequate one for 
the domain of basic taste.  
 By contrast, disagreements about other matters might license an attribution of both 
criterial and axiological fault without licensing an attribution of deontic fault. And this might 
be what happens in typical cases of disagreement about refined aesthetic matters. Although it 
would seem appropriate for Julie to assess Jill’s contrary but equally well informed view as 
somehow inferior—and thus to attribute axiological fault—it would seem inappropriate for 
Julie to assess Jill’s contrary view as impermissible. Thus, no deontic fault seems to be 
forthcoming. In this respect, the (NP-2) model of the normativity of truth would be the adequate 
one for the domain of refined aesthetics.  
 Lastly, some disagreements might license an attribution of all these kinds of fault. This 
seems to be what happens in disagreements about fundamental moral issues where both parties 
would deem it appropriate to assess the opposite party’s contrary view not only as incorrect and 
morally less valuable but also as one that ought not to be had. If this is right, then (NP-1) would 
be the right model for the normativity of truth in the fundamental moral domain.  
 An important question remains as to whether sense can be made of the (NP-4) model of 
the normativity of truth—i.e. whether we can have sensible disagreements involving 
judgements teleologically constrained by truth where no fault is involved. This ultimately 
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depends on whether we can have a normatively inert truth property operating locally, in some 
areas of discourse.42  
 
XI. Conclusions 
I have discussed what I take to be an interesting variability in the normative significance of 
disagreement and I have suggested that such variability requires some flexibility in the 
normative function that truth exerts in different areas of discourse. Because a monistic view on 
truth’s normative function—what I have called normative alethic monism—forces us to adopt 
a Procrustean attitude towards the normative significance of disagreement, it is inadequate as a 
general model of the normativity of truth. I have argued for this by presenting a variation of 
what is known in the truth pluralism literature as the scope problem. 
 I have outlined a pluralist framework for understanding the normativity of truth—
normative alethic pluralism—that promises to score better than normative alethic monism in 
addressing the variability in the normative significance of disagreement discussed above. The 
key point of my proposal is to understand variation in normative fault by looking at which 
dimensions of truth's normative profile operate in a given domain of discourse.  Once we adopt 
this pluralistic stance towards the normativity of truth, we obtain a framework which adequately 
models the variability in the normative significance of disagreement across different areas of 
discourse. In other words, NAP provides us with all the necessary tools for addressing the 
normative version of the scope problem.43 
 
                                                           
42 Ferrari & Moruzzi (forthcoming). 
43 This paper has enormously benefitted from discussions with Elke Brendel, Matthew Chrisman, Massimo 
Dell'Utri, Douglas Edwards, Matti Eklund, Andreas Fjellstad, Patrick Greenough, Thomas Grundmann, Paul 
Horwich, Nathan Kellen, Michael Lynch, Giacomo Melis, Anne Meylan, Moritz Müller, Carol Rovane, Andrea 
Sereni, Erik Stei, Elena Tassoni, Joe Ulatowski, Giorgio Volpe, Jack Woods, Chase Wrenn, Cory Wright, Jeremy 
Wyatt, Luca Zanetti, Dan Zeman. Special thanks are due to Carrie Ichikawa Jenkins, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Nikolaj 
Pedersen, Eva Picardi and Crispin Wright. Moreover, I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG – BR 1978/3–1) for sponsoring my postdoctoral fellowship at the 
University of Bonn. 
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